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ABSTRACT
Purpose: Ambulatory physical therapy (PT) services in Canada are required to be insured under the Canada Health Act, but only if delivered within
hospitals. The present study analyzed strategic responses used by hospitals in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) to deliver PT services in an environment
of fiscal constraint.
Methods: Key informant interviews (n¼ 47) were conducted with participants from all hospitals located within the GTA.
Results: Two primary strategic responses were identified: (1) ‘‘load shedding’’ through the elimination or reduction of services, and (2) ‘‘privatization’’
through contracting out or creating internal for-profit subsidiary clinics. All hospitals reported reductions in service delivery between 1996 and 2003, and
15.0% (7/47 hospitals) fully eliminated ambulatory services. Although only one of 47 hospitals contracted out services, another 15.0% (7/47) reported
that for-profit subsidiary clinics were created within the hospital in order to access other more profitable forms of quasi-public and private funding.
Conclusions: Strategic restructuring of services, aimed primarily at cost containment, may have yielded short-term financial savings but has also created
a ripple effect across the continuum of care. Moreover, the rise of for-profit subsidiary clinics operating within not-for-profit hospitals has emerged
without much public debate and with little research to evaluate its impact.
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RÉSUMÉ
Objectif : Conformément à la Loi canadienne sur la santé, les services de physiothérapie ambulatoire (PT) au Canada doivent être assurés, mais seulement
s’ils sont prodigués dans un hôpital. Cette étude a analysé les interventions stratégiques utilisées par les hôpitaux du Grand Toronto pour offrir de tels
services dans un environnement de compressions budgétaires.
Méthode : Des entrevues réalisées auprès de répondants clés (n¼ 47) ont été réalisées à partir de participants de tous les hôpitaux de la région du Grand
Toronto.
Résultats : Deux interventions stratégiques primaires ont été identifiées : (1) des « coupures » (« load shedding ») dans la charge de travail par l’élimination
ou la réduction des services; et (2) une forme de « privatisation » par le recours à des sous-traitants externes ou par la mise sur pied, à l’interne, de
cliniques auxiliaires à but lucratif. Tous les hôpitaux ont signalé des réductions dans la prestation de services entre 1996 et 2003, et 15 % des hôpitaux
(7 sur 47) ont complètement éliminé les unités de soins ambulatoires. Même si un seul établissement a eu recours à des sous-traitants pour des services,
15 % des établissements (7 hôpitaux sur 47) ont fait savoir qu’ils avaient créé des cliniques auxiliaires à but lucratif dans leur établissement afin d’avoir
droit à d’autres formes de financement parapublic ou privé plus profitables.
Conclusions : La restructuration stratégique des services, visant principalement à contenir les coûts, a peut-être cédé le pas à des économies à court
terme sur le plan financier, mais a également créé un effet d’effritement dans tout le continuum de soins. De plus, la tendance des cliniques à but lucratif
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poursuivant leurs activités dans des hôpitaux à but non lucratif s’est imposée sans véritable débat public et avec très peu de recherche sur leurs
répercussions.
Mots clés : financement, hôpitaux, physiothérapie, prestation
INTRODUCTION
It is a popularly held belief that Canada has a national
socialized health care system. In fact, however, this is not
the case. Canadian health care is defined as a universal
system that is publicly funded and privately delivered,
and in which the federal responsibility is to provide
funding and the provincial/territorial responsibility is to
organize and deliver services.1 The term ‘‘socialized
health care’’ implies that some level of government deli-
vers institutional or hospital-based services at a national
level; but across Canada, close to 98% of hospitals are
private not-for-profit institutions that receive public
funding to deliver services to eligible residents in each
jurisdiction.2,3 The principal legislation that underpins
the delivery of health services is the Canada Health Act
(CHA), which stipulates that in order to receive federal
funding, provinces and territories must agree to provide
‘‘medically necessary’’ physician and hospital services to
eligible residents. Because most hospitals in provinces
and territories are private (not public) not-for-profit
institutions, they also have considerable scope to be
innovative and flexible in delivering health services so
as to maintain federal funding.4
The costs of Canada’s national health insurance
programme reached CAD$142 billion in 2005, a 7.7%
increase from 2004.5 In 2007, the cost of the health
system reached $160 billion; it has been recently reported
that the cost of health care outpaced inflation and
population growth for the eleventh consecutive year.6
Moreover, per capita health expenditures reached
$4,867 in 2007, which, after adjusting for inflation, repre-
sented a 5.3% increase from the year before.6 Hospitals
are consistently ranked the largest single expense
within the health system; in 2007, for example, 28.7% of
the overall national-level expenses (approximately
$45 billion) was spent on hospital services. Based on
these trends, since the early 1990s there has been a
sense that health care costs are rising, especially as they
relate to hospitals.7 As a result of such escalating costs,
hospitals across the country have implemented various
reform strategies, which generally attempt to maintain
levels of service while decreasing expenditures.8
Canada, like other developed and developing countries,
continues to implement cost-cutting measures in order
to ration scarce health care dollars. 9–11
In late 2002, two influential federally commissioned
reports on Canada’s health care system were released
within a few weeks of each other. In October 2002, the
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science
and Technology, chaired by Senator Michael Kirby,
released its final report, The Health of Canadians—The
Federal Role, volume 6: Recommendations for Reform.12
In November 2002, the Commission on the Future of
Health Care in Canada, chaired by Roy Romanow,
released its final report, Building on Values: The Future
of Health Care in Canada.13 While these reports differed
in many important respects, both strongly emphasized
the importance of a publicly funded hospital-based net-
work across the country. Both reports asserted that the
theoretical underpinning of the CHA should be strength-
ened; however, both also suggested that the CHA can be
viewed from multiple perspectives. Some stakeholders
emphasize the role of the CHA as a protector of full
health coverage for insured services to eligible residents,
while others emphasize the CHA’s failure to encourage
more innovative approaches to health care delivery.14 As
a result, various stakeholders and pressure groups tend to
use the language of the CHA, and their perceptions of its
intent, to defend their particular interests against other
competing interests.1,15–17
The province of Ontario has implemented a number
of health reform strategies since the early 1990s.3,4,18
Many of these strategic responses were aimed at redu-
cing overall costs while maintaining service levels. The
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care
(MOHLTC) sought to curb health expenditures by imple-
menting overall cost-containment strategies; as a result,
hospitals were left to determine how they would respond
to fiscal constraints in a period of growing demand for
services.19–22 One option for the hospital sector was to
strategically restructure delivery in order to focus only
on core competencies and essential functions. Thus hos-
pitals, the single largest category of provincial health
expenditures, are continually searching to define which
services they must provide and which they do not neces-
sarily have to provide under the CHA. Fuller,18 Armstrong
et al.,23 and Sanger24 have noted that reform strategies
aimed at cost containment have occurred, and continue
to occur, across the evolving landscape of Canadian
health care.
Public funding of physical therapy (PT) services in
hospitals is an ambiguous component of the national
health continuum.3 Although there has been little
empirical research, anecdotal reports suggests that
hospital-based ambulatory PT services in Ontario were
vulnerable to strategic restructuring. For instance, the
Ontario Physiotherapy Association (OPA) reported that
an increasing number of hospitals have privatized the
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delivery of PT services, and voiced concerns that this
would lead to a crisis in access to quality hospital-
based services.25 Further, there have been reports that
as hospitals closed or restructured, the responsibility
for providing PT services shifts to the community—
which has also experienced massive restructuring in
Ontario. In this study we describe the strategic responses
of hospitals in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) as they
restructured ambulatory PT services in response to tight
cost-control measures imposed by the public payer
between 1996 and 2003. This study period was chosen
because it coincides with particularly relevant policy
events that occurred in the province, including the
Health Services Restructuring Commission, which
began in 1996 and ended in 2000, and the release of the
Kirby and Romanow reports in 2002. Focusing our
policy-research lens on this period provided defined tem-
poral parameters for further investigation of strategic
restructuring. The process of strategic restructuring has
gained momentum since 2003, and the results of this
study create a benchmark against which future research
findings can be compared.
METHODS
Ethics approval for this study was obtained through
the Research Ethics Board at the University of Toronto.
A series of key informant interviews was conducted to
supplement the available literature and to explore per-
ceptions of structural changes to hospital-based ambula-
tory PT delivery. For the purposes of the study, only
hospitals located in Region 3 of the Ontario Hospital
Association (OHA), also known as the Greater Toronto
Area (GTA), were included. The GTA was chosen for
analysis because it is an urban area with a highly diverse
population of approximately 5 million persons served by
a sufficient number of hospitals to allow for comparison.
The GTA is also regarded within the industry as the pro-
vincial area that has most significantly restructured the
delivery of hospital-based PT services; as well, an analysis
of hospitals in the GTA was most geographically feasible
for the purposes of this research. It is important to
acknowledge, however, that the GTA, being a large, mul-
ticultural urban setting, is not necessarily representative
of the rest of Ontario or of the rest of Canada.
Initially, the study sample included all 59 GTA hospi-
tals listed by the OHA. There were two exclusion criteria.
First, all corporate offices listed in the GTA were removed
from the sample, since these locations are not settings in
which health services (including PT) are funded and
delivered. Second, hospitals with a particular focus on
mental health were excluded, because they represent a
health service that provides care to a very specific
population that generally does not include significant
PT services. Removing these sites resulted in a more
homogeneous sample. After exclusion of the six
corporate offices (exclusion criterion #1) and the six
mental-health hospitals (exclusion criterion #2) from
the original OHA list, there remained a total of 47 hospital
sites in the sample.
Selection of Key Informants
Key informant interviews are in-depth, semi-struc-
tured interviews with people selected for their expert
knowledge on a specific topic.26 Informed by the results
from our literature and data search, we conducted a
series of 47 telephone interviews in February and
March 2003 with key informants at each hospital
included in the study who could provide a rich descrip-
tion of the delivery of hospital-based ambulatory PT ser-
vices. Potential key informants were selected purposively,
using the following criteria: (1) working at a specific hos-
pital in the GTA for at least 5 years; (2) responsible for
either clinical or operations management; and (3) willing
to participate in a telephone interview within relatively
tight timelines. The investigators first generated a list and
then contacted potential informants who matched the
above criteria for each hospital included in the study
sample. Initially, potential informants were contacted
by telephone or e-mail in order to gauge their interest
in participating in a 45-minute semi-structured inter-
view; if the individual agreed, a mutually convenient
time was tentatively arranged to conduct the interview.
All individuals contacted agreed to participate. The key
informant interviews were conducted by telephone,
using a semi-structured interview schedule (see
Table 1) that enabled the investigators to explore partici-
pants’ perspectives broadly and to uncover hidden and
emerging themes while maintaining the study focus.26–29
Permission was requested to audiotape the telephone
interviews, and all but one informant agreed to this con-
dition. For this interview, the primary investigator kept
detailed handwritten notes during the interview. The
audiotapes were immediately sent to a research assistant
outside the investigative team for transcription.
Data Analysis
The transcribed interview data were entered into a
qualitative data-analysis software package (NVivo, QSR
International Pty Ltd., Doncaster, VIC, Australia) for
systematic coding. Content analysis, which involves
identifying themes and categories prior to coding the
data, was used to guide the qualitative description.27,28
The themes included in the coding were based on collec-
tive knowledge, perceptions, and experiences of the
researchers that addressed the research objectives.28
Specifically, the themes were related to macro-level stra-
tegic responses, along with sub-themes that describe the
themes in much more detail. Although many coding
themes were developed for this study, only those related
Landry et al. Strategic Responses to Fiscal Constraints 223
to the description of strategic responses will be presented
here.
The primary investigator (ML) performed all the
coding, then generated coding reports for the research
team to analyze. Once all transcripts had been coded
for themes, another individual not involved in the
research independently reviewed and recoded 10% of
the transcripts (5/47) to validate the coding. The
two coders agreed in 90% of cases; once issues with
definitions and nomenclature had been resolved for
all interviews, the two coders reached 100% agreement.
This process has been effectively used before to ensure
appropriate data analysis.3,7,14,30
RESULTS
Interviews were conducted with 47 key informants,
including 18 physical therapists or professional practice
leaders (14 women, 4 men); 18 managers or directors of
clinical or operational programmes (12 women, 6 men);
and 11 senior managers (5 women, 6 men). The infor-
mants ranged in age from 35 to 56 years, and had an
average of 6.4 years’ experience at their respective
institutions.
Overall, informants reported that health reform stra-
tegies subsequent to fiscal constraints implemented
across successive Ontario governments had an important
impact on ambulatory services delivered across the
province. One informant asserted,
I think it [hospital restructuring] began after 1995 when
the [Progressive Conservative] Harris government started
to screw down very aggressively on money provided to
the health care system generally, and to hospitals in
particular, [. . .] and that’s when hospitals, I guess, figured
that they had no alternative but to start looking for other
ways of delivering care, and other ways of generating
revenue.
The informants agreed that multiple waves of political
change drove different health care agendas. One such
feature was a series of recommended closures and amal-
gamations of formerly independent organizations across
the province under the arm’s-length Health Services
Restructuring Commission (HSRC) (1996–2000).29 The
interview data identified two primary types of strategic
response for hospital-based PT delivery in the GTA, along
with four sub-types (see Figure 1). The primary cate-
gories were consistent with Bendick’s classifications of
restructuring;31 the macro-level structuring categories
included the ‘‘load shedding’’ response (whereby the
hospital may choose to eliminate or reduce only) and
the ‘‘privatization’’ response (whereby the hospital
may choose to contract out a service or to implement a
for-profit subsidiary clinic). Each strategic response is
described in more detail in the following sections.
The ‘‘Load Shedding’’ Response
‘‘Load Shedding’’ as a strategic response describes a
process whereby a clinical service is eliminated and reas-
signed to another sector for the funding and/or delivery
of services or is simply removed from the list of insured
services, creating a new market elsewhere for that same
service. Two sub-types of ‘‘load shedding’’ responses
were reported by informants in this study: (1) elimination
of service delivery and (2) reduction in service delivery.
Elimination of Service Delivery
The first ‘‘load shedding’’ strategic response is to elim-
inate ambulatory PT services as an insured service or
entitlement within the hospital. In this study, 7 (15.0%)
of the 47 hospital sites in the GTA reported completely
eliminating their ambulatory PT services between 1996
and 2003. Most of the elimination of services occurred
under the auspices of amalgamation: multi-hospital cor-
porations had eliminated services at some of their sites.
For instance, a large urban hospital corporation was
formed in 1999 by amalgamating two teaching hospitals
Table 1 Semi-structured Interview Guide
1 I would like to begin by asking you some information regarding your
background and professional experience.
2 What type of PT services does your facility provide? (i.e., in-patients,
out-patients, or assessments such as DACs). Prompts: Has this
basket of services provided changed between 1990 and the pres-
ent? What are the criteria for accessing these services?
3 How are these programmes financed and delivered? Prompts:
Do you provide PT services in-house, or do you contract out
these services to private providers?
4 How standardized are your assessment and treatment processes? Do
you use clinical practice guidelines? Do you perform chart audits
to look at care processes?
5 Who determines number of treatments and duration of each treat-
ment session?
6 Are there waiting lists for receiving PT care? If yes, which type
of client is placed on the lists, and how are they managed? How
long is the average wait time?
7 Do clients with different levels of funding receive different levels
of care?
8 Do you often refer clients elsewhere because of funding issues, or
do you provide PT services to persons regardless of their funding?
9 Do you bill the client directly, or indirectly through a third party, for
PT services? Prompts: How do you extra bill for services? (i.e.,
direct to the client?)
10 Is your facility accredited by an external organization, or are you
planning to be accredited?
11 What is the role of non-regulated providers in your facility? Prompts:
Do you use non-regulated professionals to provide direct and
indirect care?
12 How does the facility provide staff development (prompt: continuing
professional education, etc.)? How many dollars or hours per year?
13 How might the structure/outcome of care change when PT services
are privatized?
14 Whether or not your hospital has contracted out PT services, I’d like
to ask you a few questions regarding your opinion on the privati-
zation of PT services in hospital.
15 Are there many hospitals in Ontario that have contracted out PT
services? What about the hospitals in the Metro Toronto area?
Prompt: Why do you think hospitals may wish to privatize or
contract out PT services?
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and one specialized cancer hospital; following this amal-
gamation, the corporation eliminated all outpatient PT
services at two of the three sites and shifted all ambula-
tory PT services to one site. However, another large
free-standing teaching hospital in Toronto’s downtown
corridor (with only one location) decided to completely
eliminate ambulatory PT services in 2003, arguing that
this would allow the hospital to focus on other core
services. Two other similar free-standing hospitals also
completely eliminated services. Our informants indicated
that the decision to eliminate services was a last resort,
and that the decision was made for financial and not
clinical reasons.
Reduction in Service Delivery
Our informants signalled that the most common
restructuring strategy used by GTA hospitals was the
‘‘reduction’’ approach. This category of strategic restruc-
turing involved hospital sites’ choosing to reduce the
volume of ambulatory PT services delivered. In total,
32 of the 47 hospital sites in the GTA (68.0%) used this
strategic manoeuvre between 1996 and 2003.
The ways in which hospitals reduced services were
noted by respondents as an important element. Strict
inclusion or access criteria were used to reduce ambula-
tory services; for example, between 1996 and 2003 many
hospitals in the GTA implemented a requirement that
clients be referred by a physician practising within
the hospital and/or that clients reside in the hospital’s
direct catchment area in order to access hospital-based
services. Although not a particularly creative or novel
approach, implementing strict access criteria across all
hospitals sites was mentioned by participants as a defin-
ing feature of the study period.
Some hospitals employed other strategies, such as
using acuity as a criterion to ration services or reducing
the hours of operation of the ambulatory service. As one
informant noted,
The other significant thing is reduction in supply. So
anecdotally I know one hospital . . . who says ‘‘well we
only have outpatient services three afternoons a week.’’
So even if there is a department, there’s a drastic reduc-
tion in the number of full-time-equivalent therapists . . .
Although our qualitative data do not allow us to gauge
the degree of reduction in service delivery, respondents
in this study, ranging from physical therapy practice lea-
ders to senior executives, indicated that such reductions
did occur and that they had a direct impact at the client
level. Our informants reported that these reductions were
part of an overall strategy to cut costs but that they also
created a ripple effect across the publicly funded care
continuum, especially since demand for services was
also reported to rise during the study period. For
instance, hospitals’ implementing a reductionist strategy
for PT services while demand for services was rising
meant that individuals who could not receive hospital-
based ambulatory services would need to search else-
where for PT services. In Ontario, as in all other
Canadian jurisdictions, individuals have the option to
pay out of pocket for PT services, but not all are able or
willing to pay. For individuals in the GTA willing or able
to pay privately, there were many options in the commu-
nity; for those who were not able or willing to pay and
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Figure 1 Strategic responses in hospital-based ambulatory physical therapy service delivery in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).
Landry et al. Strategic Responses to Fiscal Constraints 225
needed to find a publicly funded option, however, access
to services could no longer be guaranteed, or even pre-
sumed. The effects of poor access to publicly funded
services and poor availability of publicly funded commu-
nity-based PT have been reported elsewhere14,30 and will
not be reviewed here; however, it is important to note
that the respondents considered the reduction trend
likely to continue well into the future and acknowledged
that this process may have unknown effects across the
care continuum.
The ‘‘Privatization’’ Response
Privatization is defined as the transfer of a one-time
public-sector service (or its representative agents) to
private companies that often operate on a for-profit
basis.30,31 Two sub-types of ‘‘privatization’’ were
reported in this study: (1) contracting out and (2) creating
for-profit subsidiary clinics.
Contracting Out
Contracting out service delivery is a process whereby a
firm, including a hospital or government, contracts
with other not-for-profit and for-profit firms to provide
goods and services. The ‘‘contracting out’’ strategy was
not widely used in the GTA, where only one hospital
contracted out the delivery of outpatient PT services to
an external provider. When asked why a hospital would
contract out its services, one informant reported,
It’s either to save money or to create a new revenue
source, or some combination of the two. That’s the
bottom line. Certainly it was in [hospital name]’s case
. . . it was to save money in the budget.
This specific hospital entered into a contractual agree-
ment with an external provider that assumed the respon-
sibility for delivery of outpatient PT services, along with
all operational responsibility, ranging from human
resource management to invoicing. In doing so, this
hospital continued to offer services but no longer had
operational responsibility for delivery. The contractual
agreement between the two parties was confidential
and proprietary; as a result, the precise details of the
arrangement were not available for public scrutiny.
In general, however, our informants indicated that
there are multiple approaches to contracting out services,
including simply renting space to the external provider,
purchasing services from the independent contractor at a
lower cost, and configuring a profit-sharing arrangement.
One informant said,
The motivation for me [to contract out] was threefold.
[First] there was going to be some subsidizing of my
hospital programmes, [second] to increase productivity
. . . and [third] to improved service quality.
The same informant also confirmed that the hospital
would have chosen to ‘‘eliminate’’ the service, had they
not contracted it out, in response to fiscal pressure
imposed by senior management.
Although only one hospital in the GTA decided to con-
tract out PT services during the study period, the majority
of the others had considered this option before deciding
on other strategic approaches. For instance, another hos-
pital located at the periphery of the GTA attempted to
contract out services in 2001, but this approach was
never implemented because of strong opposition, both
internal (e.g., from hospital staff and union) and external
(e.g., from the local community). Instead of contracting
out, this hospital initiated a subsidiary clinic model
(described below).
As noted by O’Looney,32 the contracting-out process
may in theory reduce services by allocating fewer
resources to the provider under contract than were
previously allocated to the hospital PT department. One
issue underpinning the choice to contract out relates to
efficiency in service delivery. It is noteworthy that many
respondents (35/47, or 74.4%) suggested that hospital-
based services are perceived as relatively inefficient,
where ‘‘efficiency’’ is defined by the amount of
‘‘output’’ given the amount of ‘‘input.’’ Although few
details were provided, one informant reported that
when I worked in the hospital, in the outpatient depart-
ment, I know that I was inefficient. I didn’t think I was
being inefficient at the time, because I didn’t know any
better. But when I look now at the private clinics [that I
work for within the hospital] I know that I could have
been more efficient . . .
Other informants echoed these comments:
I cannot not tell you how inefficient and with total
disregard for best practice and fiscal restraints hospital-
based PT departments run.
Now I certainly believe that hospital departments need to
be cleaned up. They probably need somebody from
business, independent business company to go in and
help them save money and be more efficient with their
money.
A minority of informants indicated that contracting
out is purported to generate efficiencies assumed to be
inherent in the private sector, including mechanisms
such as competition, economies of scale, and use of
more efficient service-delivery techniques. However,
other informants suggested that the primary way in
which such ‘‘efficiencies’’ were achieved was through
changing labour agreements and employee benefits
and using a different staffing mix (generally including
fewer regulated professionals and more trained support
personnel). In the words of one informant,
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sometimes they’ll [hospitals] outsource so that they don’t
have the responsibility for benefits and the benefits
costs, the salary costs . . . [along with] . . . recruitment
and retention costs.
Creating For-Profit Subsidiary Clinics
The final strategic restructuring response reported by
the informants was that of creating for-profit ‘‘subsidiary’’
clinics within the hospital. This strategy involves a pro-
cess whereby a hospital may choose to create an inde-
pendent for-profit clinic within the corporate structure.
The subsidiary clinic is essentially a private practice
owned and operated by the hospital. Although efforts
were required to ensure that such clinics did not violate
the CHA prohibitions on extra billing of insured persons
for insured services, 7 of the 47 hospital sites in the
GTA (15.0%) did create for-profit clinics within the not-
for-profit hospital during the study period.
According to our informants, the creation of a subsid-
iary clinic provided an opportunity for the hospital
to more easily access funding beyond that provided
through the hospital global budget. These additional
funding sources include quasi-public streams such as
the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) and
motor vehicle accident (MVA) insurance, as well as pri-
vate streams such as private out-of-pocket payments and
third-party reimbursements. Many respondents noted
that ambulatory PT services have long waiting lists with
a high number of clients eligible for other funding
streams; thus, the subsidiary clinic model permits
access to these more lucrative funding sources. When
asked about the rationale behind creating subsidiary
clinics, one informant offered the following comment:
. . . suddenly hospitals were in the business of generating
revenue. Rehabilitation services, particularly with
changes in WSIB and changes in the auto insurance
piece, became revenue-generating opportunity, and
hospitals started moving into ways of using rehab services
to generate some. Sometimes the funds went back into
the rehabilitation services to keep them alive. A lot of time
they went back into the hospital as a whole.
Ultimately, the subsidiary model allowed hospitals to
diversify their revenue streams. The profits generated
by these for-profit initiatives might be directed toward
subsidizing the global budget allocated for other
hospital-based PT services; however, our informants
noted that usually the profits were redirected to the hos-
pital’s base budget and not necessarily allocated to
PT services. Based on the findings of this study, the ratio-
nale for creating subsidiary clinics included both
(1) diversifying revenue streams and (2) subsidizing the
overall operations of the hospital. The rationale for
choosing a subsidiary arrangement over a contracting-
out arrangement may be linked to the notion that in a
large populated area (or an area with sufficiently high
potential volumes), hospitals can generate sufficient
economies of scale to yield a profit. Other informants
noted that the subsidiary clinic had become an essential
component of adult services. For instance, a senior man-
ager said,
We try and offset other costs for outpatient services to be
able to buy more equipment, to keep outpatient services
open . . . If we weren’t billing WSIB, we’d be treating them
anyhow—we would be treating them for nothing under
the global budget. So you might as well be getting some-
thing back to the hospital.
One informant, who at the time was employed in a
hospital operating a subsidiary clinic, noted that
‘‘we have used those dollars to enhance our public side.
Any enhancement of our public side allows us to free
up staff for in-patients,’’ as well as that ‘‘our finance
department has generally said profit made in this organi-
zation is for the entire hospital, not for the programme
that produced it.’’
DISCUSSION
Two main conclusions emerged from this study. First,
the data suggest that there were important changes in the
delivery of ambulatory PT services in GTA hospitals
between 1996 and 2003—specifically, that PT services
within hospitals have been significantly restricted, as
demonstrated by the fact that 15.0% of hospitals elimi-
nated services and by the fact that all hospitals, in one
way or another, reduced service volumes for publicly
funded services. According to respondents, these strate-
gic responses were aimed at cost reduction, and, while
the responses described were hospital based, they have
had unintended ripple effects across the continuum of
care. For instance, when services were reduced or elimi-
nated, individuals had to decide whether to (1) go with-
out PT services, if they were not insured by public
or private sources; (2) pay out of pocket; or (3) access
private third-party insurance they might be eligible to
receive.
A previous study reported that partial delisting of
community-based PT services resulted in 17.7% of the
study sample’s going without PT services because they
were uninsured, underinsured, or unable to pay pri-
vately.33 After controlling for gender, age, and employ-
ment status, the researchers found that individuals who
maintained access were more likely to report excellent or
very good self-reported health status (SRHS) than were
those who did not receive services (Odds Ratio: 10.72;
95% CI: 2.20–52.25). The authors also reported strong
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associations between SRHS and utilization rates of
hospitals and family physicians. Although the current
study addressed hospital-based services, previous data
on community-based PT services may be instructive
and may reflect elasticity of demand for PT services.
Briefly, the theory of elasticity of demand refers to a
change in the quantity of services demanded resulting
from a change in policy.34 PT services would thus be
considered inelastic if individuals were equally able to
access services elsewhere following a policy inflection
point, and would be considered elastic if individuals
were not able to access services. Although further
research is necessary, the findings from this hospital-
based study and from the community-based study by
Landry et al.33 signal that access to publicly funded PT
services may be economically elastic in nature.
Second, there has been a rise in for-profit subsidiary
clinics operating in hospitals, largely without public
debate and with little research to examine the system-
wide effects. A previous study identified nine models of
PT delivery in Ontario that fall into three categories of
ownership structure: public, private not-for-profit, and
private for-profit.30 The study also reported that, between
1996 and 2002, the relative proportion of PTs employed
in the not-for-profit sector decreased while the share in
the for-profit sector grew (from 40.4% to 45.2%), and
concluded that shifting balance in the structure of deliv-
ery may be transforming how PT services are provided in
the province.30 Private for-profit providers appear to have
increased their market share during the study period;
however, the outcomes relative to this shift have not
yet been fully explored. The results of the present study
confirm that the hospital sector is also experiencing a
shift in profit motive. As we have described, contract-
ing-out is not a prevalent model, but the creation of
for-profit subsidiary clinics has increased during the
study period. Our data do not permit elaboration, but
the extent to which the creation of subsidiary clinics is
consistent with the rules and regulations of the CHA
would be an informative follow-up study, especially
given the apparent propensity to create such
infrastructures.
Each province, territory, or hospital must decide
whether there is sufficient clinical and cost benefit to
maintain funding for ambulatory services such as PT in
hospitals. Although physical therapists across Canada
may believe and assume that PT services are medically
necessary to the health of Canadians, other stakeholders
do not necessarily share this perspective. Reductions in
overall hospital funding have forced policy makers, deci-
sion makers, and managers to examine the minimum
basket of services they are legally required to provide.
The results of this study highlight the fact that, based
on rising health care costs, the hospital sector in the
GTA has strategically restructured service delivery in
order to focus on core competencies and essential
functions. Thus hospitals, the single largest category of
provincial health expenditures, are continually defining
which services they must provide and those they do not
necessarily have to provide under the CHA. Although
there has been little empirical research, our data suggest
that publicly funded hospital-based ambulatory PT ser-
vices in Ontario are vulnerable. The extent to which stra-
tegic restructuring has occurred within PT services, and
the implications of this process for cost and access, has
not yet been determined. The search for such empirical
evidence represents the next step in understanding the
extent to which strategic restructuring has affected the
health and well-being of Canadians at the local, regional,
and national levels.
The study period of 1996 to 2003 provided a context to
examine strategic responses to fiscal constraints in a par-
ticularly important policy period in Ontario. Moreover,
our data set the stage for further research, especially
given the apparent increase in strategic manoeuvres
reported in this study. For instance, a recent cross-sec-
tional telephone survey of hospitals in Ontario found not
only that approximately 17% no longer offer PT services
but also that the vast majority of hospitals that continue
to offer such services have incorporated private funding
to finance ambulatory PT services.35 Moreover, closures
of hospital-based PT services continue, described in
news releases as necessary in the context of overall
cost-cutting measures.36
Despite our findings, further research is required to
more fully investigate the effects of strategic hospital
restructuring on PT service delivery. Empirical research
that will gauge the amount of reduction and the impact
of the clinical level is also needed.
It is important to note that the strategic responses
documented in the GTA may not be fully representative
of those that have occurred across Ontario, or in other
provinces and territories. In fact, based on the responses
of informants in this study, there is anecdotal evidence to
suggest that the strategic responses in less populated and
rural settings may be structurally different from those
reported in the GTA. Although less populated areas of
Ontario are also likely to have reduced and eliminated
ambulatory services, they may differ in favouring the
contracting-out strategy over the subsidiary model. As a
result, further research must gauge the short- and long-
term effects of these structural changes on the health and
mobility of individuals residing in these communities.
CONCLUSIONS
We have reported here that strategic responses used
by hospitals to deliver PT services are related to fiscal
constraints imposed on overall operations. Although
our data do not allow us to measure clinical or financial
outcomes, these strategic responses, based on reports
from our respondents, may have achieved cost savings
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and cost containment in the short term but may have
also created a ripple effect across the continuum of
care. Further data need to be evaluated for the period
from 2003 to the present in order to determine whether
this trend has continued and, if so, the extent to which
strategic responses have changed in the face of an emer-
ging and ever-changing national health care environ-
ment. Moreover, examples of strategic responses to
fiscal constraints in other areas of the province and of
the country are needed, including data from more rural
and sparsely populated regions, where services may be
more vulnerable to restructuring. Health policy and ser-
vices research must now explore the system-wide health
outcomes that result from altering the precarious balance
of not-for-profit and for-profit motives in the delivery of
PT services, and how changes to the funding mix affect
the health and rehabilitation workforce.
KEY MESSAGES
What Is Already Known on This Subject
The Canada Health Act (CHA) defines the service-
delivery parameters required for provinces and territories
to receive federal funding. However, there are ongoing
debates and challenges regarding the inclusion of pub-
licly funded physical therapy services within the CHA.
Hospitals have consistently ranked as the largest expen-
diture category within health systems; in the province of
Ontario, as the cost of health care has risen, hospitals
have implemented strategic restructuring manoeuvres
aimed at reducing overall cost while still complying
with the terms and conditions of the CHA. The extent
to which hospital-based physical therapy services have
been strategically restructured in response to fiscal con-
straints had not previously been explored.
What This Study Adds
The data collected in this study suggest that all
hospital-based physical therapy services located within
the Greater Toronto Area were vulnerable to strategic
restructuring between 1996 and 2003. The two primary
strategic responses used by hospitals were ‘‘load shed-
ding’’ (through the elimination or reduction of services)
and ‘‘privatization’’ (through contracting out services or
creating internal for-profit subsidiary clinics). Strategic
restructuring of physical therapy services, aimed primar-
ily at cost containment, may have yielded short-term
financial savings but created a ripple effect across the
continuum of care. While contracting-out of service deliv-
ery was not widespread, the rise in the number of for-
profit subsidiary clinics operating within not-for-profit
hospitals has occurred with little research to evaluate its
impact on the overall publicly funded health system.
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